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ROADS TO PLACE 
BY VERA MlCHELES D U N  
Vera Micheles Dean, Professor of Irrfematiorral De- 
velopment in the Gradtat& School of Public Adminis- 
tration at New York University, was research director 
and editor of the Foreign Policy Association for many 
years and Director of the Non-Westem Civiliwthw 
Program at the University of Rochester from I954 to 
1962. She is t h  author of a number of books on world 
afldrs, the most recent of which are The Nature of the 
Non-Western World, New Patterns of Democracy ia 
India, and Builders of Emerging Nations. . . . The 
drawings are by Anna Marie Magagrra. 
Since time immemorial, the world's major religions, from Hinduism 
and Buddbism to Christianity, have preached nonviolence and en- 
joined man, "Thou shalt not kill." Yet actuaIly even those who 
otherwise practiced their religious beliefs accepted and even con- 
doned the use of force when necessary for self-defense. Depending 
on circumstances, such resort to force, again and again, has been 
interpreted as legitimate defense of individual, tribe. or nation. 
In the 20th century we, who have wrested so many secrets from 
nature, who believe that man has the capacity to control his en- 
vironment, who dream of landing on the moon, are still no better 1 prepared than the Neanderthals to remove the threat of ultimate 
resort to force; and this in spite of the prospect that today force, 
involving nuclear weapons, could wreak destruction beyond any 
experienced in history. 
Assuming that all human beings, whether Communists or non- 
I & m m h t s ,  want to avoid an apocalyptic clash, what new roads 
can we fiad to avoid the ultimate catastrophe of war? 
our three-level world 
In this search, we must r e d i  that the world we live in, like drama 
in a modern theatre, is operating on a three-leveI stage. The three 
Ievels are ( 1 ) the nation-state; (2) the regional organization, poIiti- 
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cal, economic, or military-NATO, SEATO, CENTO. ANZUS, 
the Warsaw Pact which holds together the U.S.S.R. and its Eastern 
European satellites, the Organization of American States (OAS), 
and the proliferating European agencies, notably the Common 
Market, the Coal and Steel Community, and the European Atomic 
Agency; and (3)  the world community, represented by the United 
Nations and the specialized international agencies, notably the 
World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), the International Labor Organization (KO), 
and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organi- 
zation (UNESCO). 
At each level, each of these three groups seeks to make decisions 
on the same problems, frequently with little or no attempt to consult 
the others. What often mults is the kind of snarl which would occur 
at any large city's busy intersection if all cars, trucks, bicycles, and 
pedestrians insisted on moving ahead at the same time in whatever 
direction they chose, disregarding the signals of harassed policemen. 
Yet the very variety of these multi-level operations makes fo~ 
Rexibiiity in the search for peace. 
from Berlin-- 
Examples of this variety are all around us. For instance, the pmb 
bm of West Berlin has, at one and the same time, been discussed 
by the Western powers with each other; by their ambassadors in 
Moscow individually with the Soviet pvernment; by the U.S.S.R. 
with East Germany; formally by NATO; and informally in the 
corridors of the UN, of which neither West nor East Germany is a 
member. Meanwhile, it has been suggested by Moscow that West 
Berlin be placed under the guarantee of the UN, and by Washing- 
ton that some international agency supervise access to that city. 
fa South Vietnam-- 
Or take another problem which many observers have regarded as 
an even greater threat to peace than Berlin--South Vietnam. n i s  
nation was carved out of the former French colony of Indo-Chma 
in 1954 at an international conference in Geneva where Communist 
China, whose government is not recognized by Washington, was 
present alongside the United States. At this conference Vietnam, 
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one of the three Indo-Chinese states (the two others are Laos and 
Cambodia), had been divided into Communist-contro1k.d North 
Vietnam and non-Communist South Vietnam by an agreement 
Washington did not sign, but its NATO allies Britain and France 
did. The conferees also set up an international commission com- 
posed of India, Canada, and Poland which was to insure that no 
additional foreign military personnel or material other than those 
maintained by Fmce would be sent into South Vietnam. Neither 
Laos nor Cambodia was to join in military alliances or to permit 
their territories to be used for foreign military bases, and both 
sides in Vietnam were also prohibited from doing so. 
When it became apparent in 1961 that Communist forces from 
North Vietnam were infiItrating into South Vietnam as guerrillas in 
a "war of liberatio~i" which Moscow regards as legitimate, the 
United States started to send military personnel to Saigon. These 
military were supposed only to train South Vietnam trmps for 
guedta warfare without participating actively in military opera- 
tions, but it was feared that they might eventually become engaged 
in combat. 
The presence of these military was opposed by the international 
commission, but its opposition was not heeded by Washington, 
which took the view that without American military aid South 
Vietnam might be overwhelmed by Communist f o m ,  and that 
its conquest would not only spetl the same fate for Laos and 
Cambodia, but open the way to Communist penetration of Thailand 
and the rest of Southeast Asia and the disintegration of SEATO 
(the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization). Yet neither South 
Vietnam, nor Laos, nor Cambodia is a member of SEATO. And 
?he United States did not think it necessary to bring the Vietnam 
war, which Pelcing threatened to enter, before the UN although 
Carnlmdia and Laos are UN members. 
b Cuba 
Or take still mother instance of a menace to world peace. The 
revolution staged in Cuba by Fidel Cartro was regarded by the 
United States as a threat not only to its security, but also to that 
of the OAS. Yet without consulting the OAS, Washington in 1961 
sponsored, m e d ,  and transported to Cuba an invasion force of 
Cuban exiles which was expected to bring about the overthrow d 
the Castro regime but found it impossible to perform the task. 
When it became increasingly apparent that Castro was tryhg to 
spread his ideas to other countr i~  of Lath America, the United 
State9 sought to win the support of the OAS for strong meas- 
against Cuba. At the Punta &I Este, Uruguay, conference of 
January 1962, however, Washington succeeded in obtaining tbe 
unanimous agreement of Latin American countries only for the 
view that Cuba's Marxist-]Leninist system was incompatible with 
that of the Western Hemisphere and barely obtained the news- 
sary vote (14 to 1 with 6 abstentions) to a resolution providing 
for exclusion of the Castro government from the OAS. Although, 
in Washington's opinion, a Communist-dominated Cuba endangered 
world peace, the United States opposed discussion in the UN of 
the OAS action on Cuba, as demanded by Moscow and its satellites, 
and won the support of all the other Latin American countries, 
which oppose intervention in OAS &airs, as we11 as of some 
African and Asian nations. 
In these, and many lesser crises, the three possible paths to peace 
-national, regional, and international--have criss-crossed each 
other with ao clear demarcation ktween them and often with 
serious danger of collision. Yet each road, if well-marked and d e  
limited, serves a useful purpose in tbe search for peace. 
THE NATION ROAD 
Of the three roads, that of the nation comes most naturally to alI 
peoples, whatever their race, color, religion, ideolosy, or degree of 
economic development. It seems reasonable to most citizens that a 
nation should act in defense of what it regards as its interests, just 
as t r i k  fought with each other for survival before they grouped 
themselves into nations or as American frontiersmen once whipped 
out their guns in the wild West. 
Yet today. as one hears the problems of various nations-prob- 
lems once regarded as subject only to their sovereign decisions-as 
they are discussed in NATO or the OAS or the Common Market 
or at gatherings of the Communist blm, and mast of all in the UN 
General Assembly, one cannot help but wonder: Are nutiorrs per- 
haps becoming obsolete? But then one sees 1 10 flags flying in the 
UN Plaza on New York's East River. These flags make us sharply 
aware that not onty are the nations of Western Europe and the New 
WorId still very much alive today, as one can see by the opposition 
of French President de Gaulle to supranational organizations, but 
nearly half of the UN's members have emerged since World War 11. 
Far from being obsolete, nationalism shows greater vitality than 
ever as one people after another in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, 
and Latin America demands its place in the world community. The 
old established great powers (both the dernwracies and he 
U.S.S.R.) often express alarm in the UN about the emergence of 
these newcomersaome with ancient histories and vast populations 
but weak economically, others tiny in size like Togo or Upper Volta 
in Africa Thase newcomers, say both Western and Soviet critics, 
create a danger by their inexperience in world aflaiw and their 
alleged lack of responsibility. The great powers believe that it 
would be far better if they, who consider themselves responsible 
and experienced, were given a free hand with no interference by the 
weak and small. 
The new nations, for their part, fear that the great powers (both 
the Western bloc and the Soviet bloc) may use their military and 
financial might in an irresponsible way and plunge the world, by 
design or by accident, into nuclear war. Great-power dominance, 
which the non-Western peoples once regarded as a dangerous 
attribute of Watern powers, is now seen to be an attribute of aII 
large and powerful nations, including those of the Communist non- 
Western sector-the U.S.S.R. and Communist China. But while 
both great and smdl nations are now invoived in regional groups 
and in the UN, and to this extent accept certain limitations on their 
national sovereignty, all zue reluctant to entrust their security to 
agencies outside4heir own borders and hold loyalty to the nation 
above concern for international organizations. 
what is nationalism? 
What is the essence of nationalism, stubbornly treasured by those 
who have it and sought with fierce determination by those who 
have yet to experience it? There are many ways of describing 
nationalism-in t ern  of geography, mce, language, reiion. At its 
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worst it can degenerate into violent as it did in Germany 
uader the Nazis. At its best it represents a &&ated love of we's 
fa them or, a the French say, one's put&; it is patriothm, 
Nations may lack mntigmw h m r y ,  liDEe Pakistan; or far 
centuries ewen a m h i c  home, like the Jews now atabrished in 
the state of Israel. They may have a single laaguage or religion; 
bat they may a h  include several races, languages, or rdigiomi, like 
India, the United States, the U.S.S,R., and the mdd-mid couutrh 
of East A f r h  In -, what m&s a nation Is a sense d 
~ w ~ S a n d W t i 0 1 1 6 , a s e n s e o f b e t o l r g i n g t o a g i w m  
gooplc, of W d  identity." The Fmch philosopher Renan uses 
the phrase 'the gout of a nation," 
nationalism-herdic01 or parochiul? 
The "soul" of a nation is a precious asset not only to its people 
but also to the world community, provided it is used not as a 
weapon against other nations but as a p int  of departure for estab 
lishing shared relations with them, thereby enriching aII. Today 
it is difficult to realize that when nation-states began to emerge 
after the break-up of the Holy Roman Empire, nationalism seemed 
a heresy to those who believed in an all-embracing realm under the 
Church. George Bernard Shaw vividly portrayed this feeling in his 
play Saint Joan, where the French Bishop of Beauvais, Peter 
Cauchon, says: "But as a priest I have gained a knowledge of the 
minds of the common people; and there you will h d  another 
dangerous idea. 1 can express it only by such phrases as France for 
the French, England for the English, Italy for the Italians, Spain 
for the Spanish. It is sometimes so narrow and bitter in country 
folk that it surprises me that this country girl can rise ahwe the 
idea of her village for its villagers. But she can. She does. . . . 
''To her the French-speaking people are what the Holy Scriptures 
descrik as a nation. CaIl this side of her heresy. Nationalism, if 
you will. I can find no better name for it. I can only teIl you it is 
essentially anti-Catholic and anti-Christian, for the Catholic Church 
knows only one realm of Christ's kingdom. Divide that kingdom 
into nations and you dethrone Christ." 
Now that the world has been divided into more than a hundred 
nations, far beyond the imagining of any medieval W e r ,  now that 
" s e l f d e t e ~ t i w  of nations" flourishes everywhere, there is again 
a feeling that nationalism can become a danger unless it is wwen 
into the fabric of larger units. 
The danger today is that the world will become full of national 
entities so small and weak that they will be helpless to survive and 
may, as w n  as they are freed from Western mldal rule, fall prey 
to the encroachments of Communist powers or of their own 
stronger n e i g h h .  There is no doubt that the nation continues to 
serve essential purposes, both in the administration of the people 
and the resources within its borders and for the expression of the 
national genius. But in the increasingly complex world of our 
times, with the interweaving of science, technology, industry, and 
weaponry which laces across bders, the nation is no longer the 
7 
principal road to a people's security and prosperity. Even the most 
fervent nationalists realize that nations must seek aid and protection 
tbrough collective solidarity, either in regional organizations, in the 
UN, or in both. Nationalism is no longr the heresy it seemed in the 
Middle Ages. But, like the village parochialism St. Joan defied, it is 
no longer sdcient for contemporary needs. 
THE REGION ROAD 
Since World War 11, while building the UN, whose functions are 
yet to be fully developed, nations in all the continents have also 
created a wide variety of regional organizations. Some of these are 
built on the old pattern of military alliances that has existed since 
the dawn of history. NATO, SEATO, CENTO, ANZUS, the 
Warsaw Pact, aside from the ideological content of their pro- 
nouncements, do not differ in essence from Greeoe's Delian League, 
the Triple Alliance of 1882 (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy), 
the Triple Entente of 1907 (Britain, France, Russia), or the Allies 
and the Centrd Powers of two world wars. All these, too, even 
before the existence of communism, had ideological connotations 
as well as military purposes. 
An important difference today is that, if the provisions of the 
UN Charter for collective security can be made effective, these 
various alliances would presumably no longer be regarded as neces- 
sary or acceptable and might gradually fade away since there would 
be an international alternative to national military power. Mean- 
while, one of the dficultia of existing military alliances is that, no 
matter how much their members try to endow them with other 
£unctions, it has prwed dif6cdt to transform instruments designed 
in the first instance for military defense into institutions for em- 
nomic cooperation or for assistance to fomer coionial territories. 
For example, Afticatl wuntries, upon attaining independence, 
had no d&re to become dgned with NATO which to them still 
lwks like a militmy bloc dominated by former oolonial powers. 
Similarly, Yugoslavia, which in the days of Stalin came to the 
conclusion that a Communist great power can be as "imperialist" 
as a democracy, daes not see the Warsaw Pact as a source of aid to 
its future development. Nor has it proved easy for either of the two 
great power b l w ,  the West or the Swiets, to keep their respecCiw 
members in line on matters military or ideorogical during a pm- 
longed period of "coexistence" when, in the absence d mortal 
combat, alfiances provide no cement for divided and sometimes 
codicting interests. 
economits-yes; p o l i t i c ~ o  
Far more successful than military alliances have proved ehrts to 
build regional maperation on the basis of common economic and 
scientific interests. In Western Europe the Common Market, the 
Cod and Steel Community, and the European Atomic Agency have 
demonstrated that three important practical needs-for trade, for 
industrial ~ U T C ~ S ,  and for atomic energy--could overcome p n  
found national differences and jealousies, although not without 
sharp growing-ph* 
Europe's gmdual economic integration has not only s p d  the 
United States. Canada, and Britain to sbare in the anticipattd 
benefits of a vastly enlarged m a r k ,  but has inspired other regions 
to consider comparable developments for Africa and Latin America. 
Meanwhile, in Eastern Europe, the Soviet bloc, through its ew- 
nomic organization, COMECON, has succeeded in marshaling the 
resources of agrarian and more or less industrialized economics 
both for mutual exchanges of goods aad for joint aid to under- 
developed cormtries--although so far with major advantages for 
the U.S.S.R. But as each auch economic organization bas come into 
existence, nations not included in it have expressed grave concern 
about the possibility that economic regionalism might pme wen 
more dangerous to their interests than the nationalism of nati- 
states, and that the world might m n  break up into a few closed 
or semi-closed economies instead of expanding into a free world 
economy. Thus the members of the Commmwedth from Australia, 
New Zealand, and Caaada to countries of Asia and Africa have 
expressed concern about the participation of the United Kingdom 
in the Common Market. 
The achievements of regional economic cooperation, slow and 
limited as they may appear to some, have had no counterpart in 
I *See F w g i n r  a UnUuJ. Eurcqe by Robert L. Heilbmner, Pubb Affnlrr Pamphlet No. 308, twenty-five cents. 
political integration Although a CoumiI of Europe exists, there 
has as yet been no indication that even the technologically advanced 
camtries of Western Europe and North America, which share 
common traditions and have comparable institutions, are ready to 
give this Council an important role or to join in an Atlantic Com- 
munity; or that Moscow's Eastern European satellites, in spite of 
prolonged Comrnunist indoctrination, cornmon fear of Germany, 
and a common Slavic heritage in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and 
Bulgaria, are wiling to accept its dictation beyond the point of 
unavoidable n-ity; or that the countries of Asia, the Middle 
East, or Africa are ready to come together under the leadership of 
a single power, be it India, Japan or Egypt, or Ghana or Nigeria. 
Those who are troubled by the slow growth of the UN might ask 
themselves why the politically democratic, highly educated, and 
tecbnoIogidly advanced Western nations have been unable to 
unite siace the days of Charlemagne; and why Eastern Europe has 
been held together, in uneasy cohabitation, only by force. 
In all continents, regional organizations, valuable as they may be 
for certain practical purposes, do not seem able to hoId within 
bounds the larger aspirations of nations which are increasinglp 
aware that trade and scienoe, armaments and politim, not to speak 
of outer-space exploration, cannot be fully developed or controlled 
within a framework narrower than that of the world. 
THE WORLD ROAD 
In contrast to the nation-state and the regional organization, each 
of which has geographic and psychologicd limitations, the world 
community now in the making, as represented by the UN and other 
international agencies, aims to include all the peoples of the glob 
and, within the limits of their resources, to serve them all. Because 
of its potentially universal scope, the UN reflects most clearly the 
vast changes that are sweeping the world. At the same time its 
activities. modest as they are when compared to the objectives set 
forth in the UN Charter, foreshadow new paths to peace. 
First of all, it is in the UN that the post-World War I1 change in 
relationships between the great powers and the small is most strik- 
ingly evident. The emergence of small nations has profoundly 
altered the role. and thus the influence, of all great powers, & 
muaist and non-Communist. Today the great powers no Ionger 
dominate the UN as they did when the worId organhtiw was 
created in I945 and when the Big Five (Britain, France, the 
U.S.S.R., the United States, and Nationalist China) obtained the 
right of veto in the Security Council in spite of strong oppit ion by 
the small nations. True, the United States and the U.S.S.R. can, if 
they wish, wield the ultimate weapon of nuclear arms. But if they 
want to achieve their objectives without resort to force, they must 
seek to win the support of large, although relatively weak, newly 
independent nations such as hdia; of nations not new, but now 
determined to exercise greater influence, such as Argentina and 
Mexioo; and of the many small nations whose expanding ranks 
are making the waIls of the Assembly hall buIge. 
What we are witnessing on the world scene is a change com- 
parable to that which occurred in the societies of Wtxtem Europe 
as a result of the English, French, and American revolutions. Then 
the gradual extension of the vote to larger and still larger numkrs 
of the population brought a h u t  political democratization and ex- 
pansion of economic and m i a l  opportunities for more and more 
people. Through these changes the poor gradually became the 
equals of the strong and the rich-not necessarily in terms of 
material assets or physical power or influence, but in terms of the 
right of each citizen to cast one vote. The rich, the more highly 
educated, the more socially influential could still exercise greater 
influence than the p r .  But if the few wanted to carry through the 
projects they favored. they had to enlist the political support of 
the many. They could not do so by casting, as individuals, more 
votes than the poor. 
Today some of the great powers favor weighted voting in the 
UN. They would give more votes to those nations which have the 
largest populations or the richest natural resources or the most 
developed economies or the highest level of education. Such a 
system now prevails in the World Bank. In the broader sphere of 
the UN, however, these proposals have no more chance of success 
than the attempts made in some democratic wieties to give special 
voting privileges to the rich or to the better educated or to those 
who are white instead of some other color. 
one notion, one vote 
True, a nation which represents a group of human beings cannot 
be compared exactly with an individual citizen, But until individual 
citizens can be directly represented on a voting basis in the UN 
or in regional political organizations like the Council of Europe, 
there is no unit to deal with except the nation. As a corporate 
entity acting on behalf of its citizens, the nation, for the time being, 
can be compared to the individual voter in the nation-state. In the 
world community, as within the mdern nation-state, any attempt 
to set up first-class citizenship for a few, while relegating the many 
to second, third, or whatever other rank might be devised, will be 
rejected by the UN members affected as an intolerable discrimha- 
tion. Those citizens of great powers who regard equality of voting 
in the UN as unfair are urged by Louis J. Halie, former member of 
the State Department Policy Planning Staff, in his book Men and 
Nations, "not to forget that the fifty non-sovereign American statut 
are equally represented in the Senate of the United States, ot*that 
the twenty-two Swiss cantons are equally represented in the Cowid 
of States at Berne, just as the hundred or more members of the 
United Nations are equally represented in the General AssembIy." 
It may well be, as Mr. HaUe points out, that voting amqem& 
for our Senate, and for the Swiss Coundl of Stam, "no longer 
represent an existing logic, but they do represent workability." 
Perhaps, eventually, it will seem advisable to alter representation 
in our Senate, and in the Swiss Council, and in the UN General 
Assembly. In haman affairs nothing is eternal. If enough citizetlg 
in the United States, and enough nations in the UN, want to make 
changes, this should not prove beyond human capacity. Tbe UN 
is not a static organization, any more than is our political system or 
the system of any nation. Many suggations for changes in the UN 
structure are already being offered, but so far most of them are 
&signed to broaden the participation of all members, rather than 
to strengthen the rights of the great powers. 
Moreover, sooner or later the smaller nations, which when acting 
together will soon command a majority, may press for termination 
of tbe great powers' special privilege, their veto in the Security 
Council-id the Big Five do not gracefully relinquish if of their 
own free win. Meanwhile, UN oficids have reoDgnized the need 
to broaden the representation of the new nations in the organs and 
on the staff of the world organizatim. In the future it may prove 
necessary to enlarge the membership of the Security Council, 
hitherto dominated by the five permanent great powers, as well as 
of the Ewnomic and Social Council whose influence may be 
expected to grow as problems of economic and social devetopment 
in the noa-Western areas assume increasing importance. 
the "multilohrul urn brello" 
Critics of the UPJ also frequently argue that the new nations need 
the world organization far more than tbe great powers, implying 
that for this reason the smaller nations should in some way d&r 
to the big ones. This contention is not supported by the realitits of 
today's world. As Andrew W. Cordier, former executive assistmt 
to the UN SeFretary General, bas pointed out, the great powers 
need the ON as much as the smaIl. In his words, the UN serves as 
a "multilateral umbrella" for world diplomacy, under which the 
great and small can thresh out and adjust their differences. 
neither--nor 
There is a second aspect of the UN that points to the future-and 
that is the picture of the world mirrored in the debates of the 
General Assembly. These debates, in which all members of the 
UN participate, reveal thc realities of the international situation 
more accurately than negotiations between nations or within 
regional organizations, which are often obscured by old concepts 
whose reiteration over the years blocks the initiation of new policies. 
Viewed from the United States, two main factors appear to rend 
the world community : the ideological struggle between communism 
and democracy; and a continuing conflict between what is left of 
Western colonialism and the aspirations of newly Iihrated co1wial 
peoples and peoples still struggling for independence. Seen in this 
light. the world seems menaced by a head-on collision between the 
two great-power blocs of the West and the Communists; and the 
Communists might win ultimate victory by obtaining the support of 
non-Western peoples who are believed to be dominated and guided 
by an anti-colonialism which has produced anti-Westernism. 
But seen from the UN forum, the outlook is vastly different. 
There it becomes clear that there are many degrees of liberty and 
authoritarianism. What becomes evident in the UN is that neither 
Western democracy nor communism has won a clear-cut victory in 
the non-Western areas; and that the largest segment of the world, 
as yet neither democratic nor Communist, is in a fluid state, subject 
to many unpredictable changes in the years ahead. Nor-judging 
by the votes cast in the General Assembly, the Trusteeship Council, 
the Economic and Social Council, and even the Security Council- 
do the new nations slavishly follow the directions d the U.S.S.R., 
any more than they do those of the Western powers. 
"no alternative )o decolonization" 
As for the alleged enmity of former and present oolonid nations 
toward the West, it is true that nations which were only yesterday 
ruled by Britain, France, BeIgium, and the Netherlands, or are 
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still ruled by Portugal snd Spain, have a vivid conscioumm of heir 
grievances, past or present, against their foreign ruIers. This should 
come as no surprise to Americans. It has takw nearly twr, hundred 
years for descendants of the American colonkts to overcome their 
opposition to colonialism as practiced by Britain-and it has k n  
achieved only because the colonial powers have mgnized since 
1945, as the French newspaper LR M n d e  put it in 1962, that there 
is "no alternative to decotonization." To expect that, in contrast 
to Americans, the Asians, Africans, and Arabs can shed their 
memories of colonial experience within months, or even years, L 
unrealistic. k t  us bear in mind, tm, that the American rebels were 
of the same origin, wlor, and economic and social background as 
the colonizers and were thus spared the psycho10gkaI tensions of 
racial discrimination which have been the harshest feature of 
colonid rule. 
persisting memories 
To the black and brown peoples of these nations, colonialism still 
means rule by whites wer men and women of color--and they see 
this system still very much alive today in Angola and Mozambique, 
in the Modesias, in South Africa, and until yesterday in Algeria 
To them the colonialism imposed by the U.S.S.R. in Eastern 
Europe, or by the Chiiese in Tikt, has not hitherto had the same 
poignant significance as the rule of whites over non-wbites. (And 
for our part we must admit that in the United States there has been 
far more indignation about Russia's treatment of the Hungarians 
than about France's treatment d the Algerian Muslims.) It is only 
when Asians, Africans, and Arabs are seen to be treating each 
other no less ruthlessly than whites have treated non-whites in their 
overseas colonies (for example as the Chinese have done in Tibet 
or Moise Tshombe in the &go) that the emotions previously 
roused by Western ootonialism are stirred also against non-Western 
oppression. And we must bear in mind that Americans who invoked 
the spirit of our revo1ution in supporting the a n t i ~ o l o n i b  of
non-Western peoples had done far more to shake the foundations 
of Western empires before World War I than the Communists, not 
yet then in power in Russia or China, bad been able to do. 
Only when all remainhg vestiges of Western colonialism have 
been eradicated, or are seen to be definitely on the way to extinc- 
tion, will it be possible for the new nations to refocus their attention 
and b m m e  as concerned with Communist wlonialii as they have 
been in the past with that of the West. But even so, the Arab-Asian- 
African oounbies in the UN have already displayed more restraint 
in discussing the role of Portugal in Africa, the future of the Belgian 
trust territory of Ruanda-Umndi, and even discrimination against 
Africans in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa than some Ameri- 
cans have shown when our economic interests have been challenged 
in Emt, or Cuba, or Brazil. 
development of all by all 
The third important trend revealed by the experience of the UN 
is that while efforts to achieve pofiticd solidarity are often frus- 
trated, cooperation between nations in economic, social, and scien- 
tific development has proved not only feasible but highly successful. 
In its short history the UN has put far more emphasis on 
economic and s d a l  development than on political activities. As of 
2961, some 16,000 UN staff members out d a total of 18,000 
were working in economic and social affairs and on technical 
assistance, and 85 per cent of the UN's modest funds was expended 
on these activitia in "ordinary times1'-that is, when the Congo 
was not in a critical situation. But if development is not merely to 
widen the rapidly growing gap between the rich nations and the 
p r  nations (which means htween the technologicalIy advaucd 
and the technologically backward), it must be carried forward on 
a much larger scale. And it must not be d i m e .  primarily by iindi- 
vidual great powers or by groups of great powers, but though the 
UN by all for dl. 
For it is not only the great, tachnologically advanced powers, 
whether of the West or of the Soviet bloc, which can contribute 
funds, money, raw materials, food, scientific experience, and 
technical know-how to those nations which are latecomers to the 
Industrial Revolution. The small and the weak can also contribute 
special products or special skiIls or special experience. Israel, India, 
Yugoslavia, Egypt, and other non-Western nations have demon- 
strated this by the aid they have given to still less developed lands 
of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, 
There is no doubt tbat competition in aid to the deveiopi.9 1 countries by the West and by the Swid bloc has many advantapes 
for the recipient countries which are thus placed in the novel and 
favorable position of being able to pray one side against the other. 
This competition, however, has k e n  deeply colored by the cold 
war. By contrast, technical and financial aid given by the UN, 
I whose officials strive to remain above the cold war and on the 
whole succeed in maintaining a dispassionate attitude, can b 
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i granted and accepted without regard to ideological or political . 
I considerations. 
It may only be realistic to expect that in the visible future indi- 
I vidual nations will insist on giving a considerable portion, if not the 
bulk, of the funds and skills they have available for foreign develop 
i ment either directly to recipient countries or tbrwgh regional con- 
dm, thus deriving the satisfactiw of having their aid identified 
as "Gift of the U.S." or "Gift of the West" or "Gift of the U.S.S.R." 
Yet if the technologically advanced nations, irrespective of ideal* 
gks, could be persuaded to pool their resources and to place, if not 
the total, at teast a Iarger portion than in the past, under the 
administrative supervision of the UN, three gains would be achieved. 
advontuges of pooled mid 
First, the p l e d  aid could be allocated to the nations which seek 
it in an orderly way, on a long-term basis (instead of year by year 
as is now done by the United States), with some concern far 
national long-term pIans which many governments have either 
already adopted or are being urged to adopt. Witness our ten-year 
Alliance for Progress program for Latin America.) The psychologi- 
cal and political tensions now created by the recurring need for 
developing nations to go, hat in hand, to Moscow or Washington, 
London or Born, for one kind of aid or another, and the resulting 
temptation to blackmail the great powen engaged in the cold war 
by threatening to seek aid from the other side would be eliminated. 
Thus, over the years to come-and economists estimate that aid to 
the &doping countries, if it is to prove effective, should be 
planned for at least fifty years-a genuine partnership between the 
"haves" and the "have nots" could be forged. 
Second, the pooling of aid would permit tong-term planning on 
a national as well as on a regional basis. This would eliminate the 
dangers of duplication between requests for aid, competing indi- 
vidual projects, and nationalistic demands for undertakings which 
may contribute to a country's prestige but not enhance its over-all 
development, or strengthen one nation only while neglecting the 
development of the region in which it is located. 
Third, administration of aid by the UN would permit strict 
supenision of the use made by each recipient country of the funds 
allocated for its development. Such supervision is essential to the 
honest and efficient operation of all aid programs. When exercised 
by the UN, it could not be denounced by the recipients as "imper- 
ialism" or "intervention" or "strings attached"-accusatians which 
are often made against individual contributing nations. Impartial 
bookkeeping scrutiny by the LIN could also check at their inception 
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such wastage and mismanagement of millions of dollars in aid 9s 
has frequently occurred when aid has been regarded as a weapon in 
the cold war. 
Growing acceptance of the value of economic assistance through 
the UN and other international agencies would spur comparable 
cooperation in social development. 
It is clear even to the non-specialist that today no one n a t i o ~  
can rely solely on its own scientific resources, and that all would 
benefit by m r a t i v e  use of the discoveries of all. If isolation ever 
seemed an advantage in the past. today it can spell stagnation or 
decline with a resulting political discontent that might spark new 
revolutions. The most dramatic example of the need for world 
cooperation in science was the orbiting of the earth by both 
American and Soviet astronauts. The achievements of Glenn and 
Titw gave new hope to the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space, which had been inactive since its creation in 1959 
because of Moscow's objections to the composition of its member- 
ship. Now composed of 28 members, the Committee was spurred 
to activity by the pledges of both President Kennedy and Premier 
Khrushchev to collaborate in this sphere. Cooperation in less 
dramatic but equally important fields such as the prevention and 
cure of various diseases was urged by both President Kennedy and 
former President Dwight D. Eisenhower. The exchange of ideas 
among the world's many cultures is encouraged by UNESCO. And 
the UN's Technical Assistance Program offers a pool of experience 
an which all nations can draw. 
orms and mankind 
But while men look to outer space, the most difficult problem on 
earth remains that of armaments, including nuclear weapons. The 
UN Charier had prwided for the establishment of a Military 
Committee of the great powers and the allocation by each member 
nation of contingents of armed forces as well as air units to the UN 
through bilateral treaties. Sucb cooperation, however, has hitherto 
been blocked by the failure of the great powers, aligned against 
each other in the cold war after 1 947, to agree about the reduction 
of armies, navies, and air forces. The double goal set forth in the 
UN Charter of regulating and controlling national armaments and 
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at the same time assuring the security of all members of the UN 
through an international force has so far proved unattainable. 
As a result of this failure to establish a system of m1Iective 
security, UN members have invoked Atticle 51 of the Charter 
which permits individual or collective selfdefense in case of attack. 
The Soviet blw in the late 1940% went ahead and formed its 
Warsaw military group; and the Western nations, in response to 
Communist encroachments in Europe, Asia. and the Middle East, 
organized NATO. SEATO, CENT0 (the former Baghdad pact), 
and ANZUS. Meanwhile, the United States and the Latin American 
countries continued to rely on the OAS for their hemispheric de- 
fense arrangements. 
future of nueleor weapons 
These already thorny probterns were made more difficult by the 
complcx ta5k of averting nuclear war through such measures as a 
ban on further nuclear tests. control and inspection agreements that 
might be made to enforce a test ban, and methds of disposing 
of f l nuclear bombs now stockpiled by the great powers. In the UN, 
the overwhelming majority of member nations neither possess nor 
have the capacity to prduce nuclear weapons. They have, there- 
fore. expressed a deep concern about these weapons which could, 
without their participation or consent and without any discussion 
in the UN forum, be unleashed by the three powcrs which have the 
capability to produce nuclear bombs on a large scale-the United 
States, Britain, and the U.S.S.R. 
The prolonged negotiations of the Big Three in Geneva and the 
resumption of nuclear testing by the United States in April 1962, 
following Moscow's September 1961 test series, heightened the 
realization that, as time passed and scientific knowledge became 
mare widespread, other nations might enter the nuclear race. 
Among them are France, which has already tested nuclear bombs 
in the Sahara, and Communist China, which is expected to manu- 
facture bombs within two or three years, not to speak of smaller 
nations which might also make a bid to enter the nuclear "dub." 
We must realize that as long as the struggle for power continues, 
the nations which possess the most effective weapon will seek to 
improve it and to accumulate a stockpile. against future emergen- 
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cies. It is understandable that the United States and Britain want 
controlled inspection to prevent the U.S.S.R. from secretly con- 
ducting tests while it officially accepts a test ban treaty. It is also 
I understandable that the U.S.S.R., which at least until 1961 lagged behind the United States both in technoIogy and in nuclear capW- ity, should feel uneasy about the prospect that controlled inspection might have the result of freezing its annaments at a level lower than that of the United States, and particularly that of the United 
States allied with West Germany. 
No practicable solution of the problem of armaments is as yet in 
sight. From the time man first appeared on earth the possmion of 
arms has been regarded as a symbl of power and a safeguard of 
security for the individual, the tribe, and the nation. As Adlai E. 
Stevenson has pointd out, "General and complete disarmament 
envisages a degree of national restraint and of international inter- 
vention in the affairs of states, which are absolutely unprecedented." 
It is a step forward, however, that nuclear negotiations under 
the UN's sponsorship were resumed in 1962 by an eighteen-nation 
conference instructed to seek ''general and complete disarmament 
under effective international control." T h i s  conference consisted of 
the three Western nuclear powers and Canada (France refused to 
attend); five Communist countries; and eight neutralist nations of 
Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and b i n  America which are not 
directly associated either with NATO or with the Warsaw Pact. 
The discussions of this conference, although inconclusive, at least 
afforded an opportunity for nations other than those which now 
manufacture nuclear weapons ta present their views about possibili- 
ties of reducing the danger of nuclear war: 
UN peace force 
It is customary to describe all efforts to regulate or reduce weapons 
by the term "dismament." In actuality, the goal of those con- 
cerned with the deveIopment of a workable world community is 
not complete disarmament-that is, the abolition of all weapons 
and weaponeem-but the creation of conditions under which it 
would prove possible to place aH then existing weapons and armsd 
forces under the supervision of the UN, leaving limited contingents 
d security forces in the member nations for internal security only. 
This ultimate goal assumes that even if the world's governments 
agree some day to forhar from the use of force to protect their 
inten&, the wodd organization would still need armed forces and 
weapons to carry out a variety of peacekeeping operations. Some 
of these operations will be the policing of disputed areas to prevent 
clashes between contending states, such as that performed since 
1956 in the Gaza strip between Israel and Egypt by a UN Emer- 
gency Force (UNEF) composed of units contributed by ten nations, 
seven of them neutralist including India, Sweden, and Yugoslavia, 
and since 1958 by a UN group in Kashmir, along the cease-fire 
h e  between India and Pakistan. Others may be far larger in scope, 
such as the UN military operation in the Congo (ONUC), which 
was designed to restore peace in a newly liberated colony, prevent 
civil war, and avert the possibility that the two great-power blocs 
might become involved in the struggle between Congolese leaders. 
Some speak of a UN police force; others use the phrase Peace 
Force. Whatever its name, it would be designed to perfom for the 
world organization the same function that a police force perfoms 
witbin nation-states. 
But, some ask, would disarmament, even in limited form, prove 
a blessing or a curse? 
Some economists in nation-states have been concerned over the 
prospect that reduction of armaments, let alone complete disarma- 
ment, might precipitate a catastrophic decline in national economi~ 
which have Qome to rely on arms production. However, a UN 
committee of experts from ten nations of both East aod West 
reported early in 1962 that wmplete world disarmament could 
lead to wide development and prosperity rather than to economic 
depression if govements planned for it adequately in advance. In 
their opinian, "the achievement of general and complete disarma- 
ment would be an unqualified blessing to dl mankind." 
paying for peace 
The experience of the UN has revealed a frfth aspect essential for 
the making of peace. This is that for all its operations, maIl and 
large, the UN needs funds. In the past the UN has had a nearly 
perfect record of obtaining regular assessments from its m e m b e w  
F - 100 per cent for the four years 1956-59, and close to 95 pet for 1960 as shown by collections at the end of 1961. As W Lippmam has pointed out, "All this goes to show that the 
and conventional activities of the UN are financially souad and 
that they have the support of the whole membershipwest, East 
and neutral." 
Yet in 1961 the UN's budget showed a serious deficit. This 
deficit was caused wt by regular budget expenditures but by two 
special operations: the UN Emergency Force in the Gaza Strip, 
consisting of 5,000 men, and costing $20 million a year; and the 
Congo force, which as of January 1962 consisted of 16,000 soldiers 
contributed by 2 1 countries, whose average cost since July 1960 
has been about $10 million a month. These two operations are 
not part of the regular budget, and thus the member nations which 
objected to them could avoid making contributions without fear of 
Imhg their Mte in the General Assembly. The U.S.S.R. refused 
to pay for either the Gaza Strip or the Congo operation. So did the 
Arab countries. Fmce, Belgium, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Spain, and 
South Africa refused to pay for the Congo force. Some others, 
among them Latin American countries, made no contributions to 
the special operations and were also in arrears on their annual 
budget assessments. The United States supported both operations, 
and in the case of the Congo, paid 40 to 50 per cent of the cost. 
The U.S.S.R. has refused to pay assessments on special operations 
on the ground that everything the Security C o d  and the General 
Assembly have done in organizing armed forces is illegal. But the 
Charter (Article 17) states that "expenses of the organization shall 
be borne by the members as apportioned by the Cfeneral Assembly." 
UN bond issue 
To put an end to this situation, which would have left the UN with 
a dangerous deficit and made it impossible for it to undertake 
future peace-keeping operations opposed by any of its members, 
the General Assembly in 1961 requested the opinion of the Inter- 
national Court of Justice as to whetber the costs of these operations 
could be regarded as part of the UN's regular expenses. By a 9 to 5 
vote the court ruled on July 20, 1962, that all members were 
obligated to pay all of the UN assessments, but its opinion was 
advisory, and penalties for non-payment, if any, would have to 
be imposed by the Generat Assembly. 
US. experience 
The selective method of paying for the expenses of an organization 
of states should be familiar to Americans who remember this 
nation's experience under the Articles of Confederation. At that 
time it soon became apparent that requisitions on states by Con- 
gress would not yieId the sums needed for the proper operation of 
the Confederation. In the first two years under the Articles, 
Congress asked for ten million dollars and received less than 1.5 
million. During the entire period of the Confederation, the amount 
redized from requisitions barely met the government's operating 
expenses, leaving nothing over to be applied to interest on the debt. 
In 1786 New Jersey-not unlike the governments of some UN 
membe-resolved not to pay its quota until Congress was given 
exclusive power to regulate foreign trade. It was then jealous of 
New Yark and Pennsylvania which obtained revenue from foreign 
trade on gods destined for New Jersey. Congress sent a commis- 
sion to New Jersey in an effort to persuade that state to comply 
with its requisitions, but the commission's efforts proved fruitless. 
Today the UN is still at the stage where it is a loose confederation 
of nations, each of which insists on maintaining its national sov- 
ereignty and asserts the right to support UN operations when it 
wishes and to withhold its support from operations it finds unpalat- 
able. The UN is as yet far from being "the Federation of the 
World" envisaged by Alfred Lord Tennyson in his poem Locksley 
Hall, let alone-a world government. 
what kind of UN? 
The basic question which con- 
fronts us is whether the UN is to 
continue to be a loosely organized 
Concert of the World, compar- 
able on a global scale to the 
Concert of Europe of the 19th 
century. Or should the UN be 
relegated to the background, and 
should the United States support instead a "Concert of Free 
Nations" of the Atlantic area, as urged by Senator J.  William 
Fulbright? Or is the UN to become a close-knit federation com- 
posed of nation-states, whether or not grouped in a variety of 
regional organizations, endowed by its members with the authority 
to act on their behalf on a wide range of subjects, from economic 
developments to arms control, from social welfare to prevention of 
armed clashes in disputed areas? 
static or dynamic? 
This fundamental problem was stated with clarity and force by the 
Iate UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold in his annual 1961 
report on the UN, made pubiic after his death in Ndola, Rhodesia. 
In this report, which constituted his Iast testament, discussing 
different concepts of the UN, Mr. Hammarskjold wrote: 
On the om side, if has in various ways become cleur that 
cermin Members conceive of the Organization as a static 
conference mmhinery for resolving conflicts of interedx and 
ideologies with a view to peaceful co+xistence, within the 
Charter, to be served by a Secretarial which is to be re- 
garded not as fully internationalized but as representing 
within its ranks t h e  very interests and ideologies. 
Other Members have made it clear char they conceive of 
the Organization primarily ps a dynamic instrument of 
Governments through which they should aLso try to 
develop forms of executive action, undertaken on behalf of 
ail Members, and aiming at forestailing conptcts and resolv- 
ing them, once they have arisen, by appropriate diplomatic 
or political means, in a spirit of objectivity and in imple- 
mentation of the principle3 and pltrposes of the Charter. . . . 
The first concept can rejer to history and to the rraditiom 
of national policies af the past. The second can point to the 
needs of the present and of the future in a world of ever- 
closer inrernationai interdependence where nations have at 
their disposal armaments of hitherto unknown destructive 
strength. The first one i.r firmly anchored in the rim- 
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honored philosophy of sovereign national States in armed 
competition of which the most that may be expected in the 
imernatiod &Id is that they m&vs a peaceful m-existeme. 
The second one envisages possibilities of inter-governmental 
at ion ovemmding such a philosophy, and opem the road 
t o w 4  more dwefoped and incremingly effective fonns of 
constructive internurional coopemtiorr . 
dynamio--ond dispassionate 
Mr. Hammarskjald's analysis of the UN in the sixth decade of this 
century left no doubt of bis own belief that the world o m t i o n  
should play a role that wwld k both dynamic and dispassionate. 
In his view it should look beyond the horizons of nation-states, 
wbich in an interdependent world have become relatively as narrow 
as t h e  of medievaI villages, and at the same time should serve 
all nations through a Secretariat of "an exclusively internationa1 
character." This Secretariat should be recruited on as wide a 
geographical basis as possible, in accordance with the provisions of 
the Charter, but should not be designed to give "a balanced 
representation of trends or ideologies," such as had been urged 
by the U.S.S.R. which wanted the UN to be directed by a troika 
of three executive officers representing respectively the Western, 
Communist, and neutralist nations. 
"the house'' as world's shelter 
It will take time for nation-states to become accustomed to the idea 
of a strong world organization-prhaps as long as it took for the 
barons and princes of feudal Europe to accept a strong national 
executive representing the interests of al l  and actixlg an behalf of 
all within the state's geographic boundaries. But as more and more 
nations enter the UN, they are becoming gradually accustomed to 
think of the world organization, which French-speaking people call 
%e house" (la mmmn-a term applied to the place of one's 
employment) not as an alien institution to be viewed with suspicion, 
but as the best shelter yet devised for mankind Acceptance of this 
attitude toward the world community is not easy. I t  involves a sort 
of international weightlessness-an adaptation of body and mind to 
a new dimension in human affairs. 
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ROAD 10 THE 
I 
This adaptation has 
emerged nations, wbi 
1 assumed, that the non-aligned countries refuse 
ments to the UN. On the mtraty, many of 
and hospital faciiiti 
or the Congo. 
The significant point is that the non-aligned countries have 
undertaken wmiments not to military alliances of contending I 
blocs, but to the world community represented in our time by the 
I UN. By doing so they have blazed a road to a new relationship among nations, a relationship in which the joint defense of all would become the responsibility not of a few, but of all; in which 
all nations would be both non-aligned and committeammitted 
not to one great power or mother, but to the world wmmunity. 
Some Westerners, particularly in the United States and France, stiU 
believe that there must be a choice between national or regional 
arrangements and the development of a world organization. The 
issue is not one of "either+rU but of making effective use of all 
the roads avaiIable to maakmd. 
toward a multi-putriotism? 
No thoughtful person is so brash as to assert unhesitatingly that 
history will follow this or that course-and dogmatists who have 
done so have found their predictions challenged in their own lie- 
rime by actual events. But there is a growing awareness throughout 
the world that we are at a turning-point such as must have been 
reached when nation-states emerged at the end of the Middle Ages 
in Europe-a turning-point toward larger organizations of human 
beings than the nation. And this sense of larger organizations in the 
making also brings a sense of a world community where the in- 
dividual will have several loyalties-not only to his own nation, 
but to a regional group such as Europe or the Organization of 
American States, and to the still vaster group which today e m b m  
most of the peoples of the world and which tomorrow may embrace 
them an. We would all then have more than one patrie and more 
than one patriotism, But these various loyalties would not need to 
d c t  any more than we now fmd a conflict in the United States 
between the loyalty of each of us to our f d y ,  to our state, to the 
various oqankatio~~~ with which we are associated in work and 
civic responsibilities, and to the nation which embraces them all. 
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